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Alberto Vanzo 
Christian Wolff and Experimental Philosophy 
Published in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, vol. 7, edited by Daniel 
Garber and Donald Rutherford, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 225-255.  
1. Introduction 
 
‘Experimental philosophy’ is not only the name of a widely discussed new trend in the 
philosophical arena. From the late 1650s until at least 1800, scores of philosophers 
endorsed what they called experimental philosophy while polemizing against their 
speculative, armchair opponents. For instance, John Dunton opened his Young-Students-
Library of 1692 by stating that natural philosophy may be ‘Subdivided into Speculative 
and Experimental.’1 Of these two forms of natural philosophy, we must ‘as much as 
possible, Exclude the first, for an indefatigable and laborious Search into Natural 
Experiments, they being only the Certain, Sure Method to gather a true Body of 
Philosophy’.2 Along similar lines, Diderot distinguished in 1754 between 
 
two kinds of philosophy, the experimental and that based on reasoning. The 
former has its eyes bandaged, walks always feeling its way, grasps whatever 
falls into its hands and finds precious things in the end. The other gathers 
these precious things, and tries to make a torch of them; but this pretended 
torch has up to the present served it less well than the gropings of its 
rival [...]3 
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Among the authors who professed their sympathy for experimental philosophy was 
Christian Wolff. Not only did Wolff advocate the use of experiments within physics, but 
also, he claimed that 
 
experimentation could [...] be extended to all the other parts of philosophy. 
And thus a broader notion of experimental philosophy would emerge than 
when, as is usually the case, that expression is used only to designate 
experimental physics.4 
 
Following his own suggestion, Wolff emphasized the importance of experiments for 
moral and political philosophy.5 He sketched the disciplines of experimental cosmology 
(CG §4), experimental theology,6 and even experimental ontology.7 
This may strike many as surprising, given that Wolff is widely taken to be a 
rationalist8 and he is sometimes called an extreme9 or arch-rationalist.10 If Wolff was a 
thorough-going rationalist, it is unclear why he placed particular emphasis on the 
importance of experiments for every part of philosophy. In contrast with the received 
image of Wolff as a rationalist, some scholars hold that his philosophy combines 
rationalist and empiricist elements, it is a via media between empiricism and 
rationalism,11 or it cannot be adequately described by means of the distinction between 
empiricism and rationalism.12 However, even these scholars typically claim that Wolff 
grants a substantial place to non-empirical cognitions. For instance, according to 
Giorgio Tonelli, Wolff takes ontology and cosmology to be ‘completely a priori stricto 
sensu’.13 How can this be reconciled with Wolff’s proposals to develop an experimental 
ontology and an experimental cosmology? 
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This chapter assesses whether we should take the suggestion that Wolff’s 
philosophy is a ‘universal experimental philosophy’ at face value. The chapter argues 
that we should and it establishes three conclusions. The first conclusion concerns the 
role of experience in Wolff’s system. By comparing his views with those of early 
modern experimental philosophers, we can see that Wolff does not only agree with 
several of their claims, but he also puts them into practice in the way he develops his 
own philosophical system. Wolff’s system relies on experience at every step, far beyond 
what many commentators have acknowledged, including commentators who do not 
classify him as a rationalist. 
The second conclusion concerns the geographical and chronological reach of early 
modern experimental philosophy. So far, the study of experimental philosophy as a 
movement has been mostly confined to the British isles. This chapter provides evidence 
for the influence of experimental philosophy in early eighteenth-century Germany, long 
before Kant’s contemporaries explicitly endorsed the experimental method in the last 
three decades of the eighteenth century.14 
The third conclusion concerns the usefulness of the notion of experimental 
philosophy as a historiographical category. It has been argued that this notion provides 
more effective terms of reference than the traditional notion of empiricism for 
interpreting ‘the diverse range of discussions of method’ among English natural 
philosophers in the late seventeenth century.15 This chapter shows that the notion of 
experimental philosophy is also helpful for interpreting Wolff’s system. The terms 
‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’ are employed in a wealth of different meanings, not least 
with reference to Wolff.16 As a consequence, any discussion of his empiricism or 
rationalism would involve distinguishing several senses in which he can be called 
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respectively an empiricist and a rationalist. By contrast, experimental philosophers 
shared a relatively well-defined set of methodological commitments. These provide 
non-ambiguous terms of reference for interpreting Wolff’s method. The chapter argues 
that Wolff’s thought is shaped by two distinct, but compatible methodological 
commitments. They are, on the one hand, his commitment to develop a thoroughly 
experimental philosophy, and on the other hand, his commitment to build a system 
according to a mathematical demonstrative method. References to Wolff’s alleged 
empiricism and rationalism can be identified or – perhaps more usefully, given the 
ambiguity of ‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’ – replaced with references to his 
endorsement of the tenets of experimental philosophers on the one hand and of a 
mathematical demonstrative method on the other. 
After summarizing the key features of early modern experimental philosophy 
(§2), the chapter examines Wolff’s statements on the method of natural philosophy (§3) 
and on the role of hypotheses (§4). Wolff’s views are in line with those of refined 
experimentalists, except for his emphasis on the importance of a priori cognitions (§5). 
However, Wolff’s notion of a priori is so weak that experimental philosophers would be 
willing to admit the existence of a priori cognitions in Wolff’s sense (§6). More 
importantly, Wolff adheres to an ideal of philosophy as a demonstrative science that is 
indifferent to the a priori or a posteriori origin of cognitions and that accounts for 
features of his system that his experimentalism leaves unexplained (§7). 
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2. Early Modern Experimental Philosophy 
 
We can think of early modern experimental philosophy as a movement. Like many 
movements, experimental philosophy had many self-declared members (like Newton17), 
some staunch promoters (like d’Alembert), some sympathizers who were somewhat at 
the fringe, and some declared enemies (like Margaret Cavendish18). Bacon was 
posthumously recruited as ‘the patriarck of experimental philosophy’.19 Aristotle, 
Descartes and, later, Leibniz were typically portrayed as its foes.20 Experimental 
philosophers identified themselves with a tradition that was initiated by Bacon. It was 
continued by members of the early Royal Society like Boyle and Hooke and, later, by 
Newton. It was extended to the study of the human mind by Locke and to the study of 
morals by Scottish philosophers. For instance, Hume’s Treatise is subtitled ‘an Attempt 
to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects’. 
Contemporary experimental philosophers reject philosophical arguments based on 
unwarranted premises about people’s intuitions. Similarly, early modern experimental 
philosophers rejected theories about the natural world that were based on untested 
assumptions and principles.21 They typically used the terms ‘hypothesis’ and 
‘speculation’ to decry particular propositions or entire theories that did not rely on 
observations and experiments. Hence, their adversaries were called speculative 
philosophers. For instance, German experimental philosophers rejected Kant’s first 
Critique by describing it as a ‘whole of the most abstract speculations of logic and 
metaphysics’,22 ‘independent from any experience’.23 
The opponents of experimental philosophers typically endeavored to develop 
natural philosophical systems according to a demonstrative method based on principles, 
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as stated in Thomas Hobbes’ De corpore: 
 
The end of science is the demonstration of the causes and generations of 
things; which if they be not in the definitions, they cannot be found in the 
conclusion of the first syllogism, that is made from those definitions; and if 
they be not in the first conclusion, they will not be found in any further 
conclusion deduced from that; and, therefore, by proceeding in this manner, 
we shall never come to science [...]24 
 
According to experimental philosophers, their adversaries posited the principles 
used as premises for demonstrations ‘without prior recourse to experiment or 
observation or at best,’ with ‘a kind of post hoc concession to experiment or an attempt 
to save the phenomena’.25 Against this way of proceeding, seventeenth-century 
experimental philosophers put forward a two-stage model of natural philosophical 
inquiry. In the first stage, we must perform a large number of experiments and 
observations on designated topics and organize the information gathered in structured 
collections, Baconian natural histories. The primary aim of this stage is to collect data in 
preparation for the future elaboration of theories. Only in the second stage will we be 
entitled to develop theories and hypotheses. Yet compiling natural histories was an 
enormous endeavor which would occupy many generations of researchers. Theory 
construction was seen as a task which could only be accomplished in a distant future.26 
As a result, experiments and observations on the one hand, theories and hypotheses on 
the other hand, were ‘on different sides of the methodological divide’.27 
Things changed somewhat once philosophers started to acknowledge the 
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extraordinary achievements of Newton’s Principia. Newton did not employ the 
Baconian method of natural history. However, he still pursued an a posteriori approach 
to the study of nature, while opposing hypotheses and speculative theories. Along 
similar lines, later experimental philosophers emphasized the empirical origins of our 
knowledge of nature and were wary of a priori claims or arguments. As Diderot wrote in 
the passage quoted above, experimental philosophy walks ‘always feeling its way’. It 
relies on experience at every step. 
 
 
3. Wolff: An Experimental Philosopher? 
 
For chronological reasons, Wolff could not have known Diderot’s endorsement of 
experimental philosophy. However, he was well acquainted with the natural 
philosophical and methodological claims of British experimental philosophers. Wolff’s 
volumes of experimental reports contain scores of references to the works of Boyle and 
Hooke.28 Wolff was personally involved in the diffusion of Locke’s ideas in Germany. 
He acted as the Locke expert of the Acta eruditorum of Leipzig, reviewing the first 
publication of several Lockean works.29 He also reviewed works by other British 
philosophers such as Boyle and Newton. Wolff made frequent reference to Newton’s 
Principia30 and to the Opticks.31 Interestingly, Wolff refers to the second edition of the 
Principia and to the queries in the Opticks, where Newton’s adherence to the 
methodological outlook of experimental philosophy is most explicit.32 
Given Wolff’s knowledge of British experimental philosophers, it is not a 
coincidence that he repeats many of their methodological proclamations. Experimental 
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philosophers claimed that one should not posit natural philosophical principles and 
proceed solely from them, independently from experience. Wolff agrees: 
It seems to me to be still much too early to posit certain general principles 
[Gründe] as elements of things, from which one wants to derive everything 
that is possible in nature by means of the pure intellect as, for instance, 
Descartes did.33 
 
Like British experimental philosophers, Wolff holds that the employment of a wrong 
method transformed Descartes’ physics into mere fiction.34 When one infers 
prematurely particular natural events and features of natural objects from a few general 
principles, one ‘fantasizes and starts to poetize’.35 ‘Poetizing’ and ‘developing fictions’ 
were typical expressions with which British philosophers criticized Descartes. Like 
them, Wolff relates natural philosophical fictions to the abuse of hypotheses: 
 
We do not approve fabricated hypotheses, that many people nowadays ably 
introduce within natural philosophy, pretending anything arbitrarily, being 
altogether unable to prove that what they imagine could exist in nature.36 
 
Several experimental philosophers declared that, to avoid this mistake, they refrained 
from formulating hypotheses. Wolff appears to embrace the same policy: ‘I considered 
that I must avoid fictitious hypotheses, of which the writings of physicists abound 
everywhere’.37 ‘[T]he study of physics would be very useful for the benefit of human 
life if we were eventually freed from hypotheses [...]: and all my efforts tend to that 
[aim]’.38 
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Having ruled out the speculative method that is based on principles and 
hypotheses, Wolff concurs with experimental philosophers that the study of nature must 
start from experience, that is, observations and experiments. These must be carried out 
on the model of Francis Bacon.39 Wolff also praises Robert Boyle40 and Isaac Newton, 
the author of the ‘incomparable Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy’.41 Like 
Newton,42 Wolff declares: ‘Indeed, I do not admit within science any other principles, 
on the basis of which I give reason of something else, apart from those that were 
deduced from observations and experiments following a legitimate thread of 
inference’.43 
Physics must derive their principles from experience44 and never trespass its 
boundaries: ‘I do not proceed beyond what observations and experiments allow; as for 
the other things, I prefer to acknowledge my ignorance, rather than deceiving myself 
and others with fictions’.45 Wolff does not mention ‘observations and experiments’ by 
chance: he carefully distinguishes observations, which do not require our intervention, 
from experiments, which require our intervention (DM §325; Anmerckungen §99; PE 
§456). He stresses the importance of experimenting to establish truths that observations 
alone cannot reveal (DP §107). This is especially true for physics, which must start 
from experiments.46 Wolff stresses the importance of providing detailed experimental 
reports, which will enable others to replicate the experiments.47 He puts his 
recommendation in practice in his three volumes of experimental reports.48 
Eighteenth-century experimental philosophers endeavored to apply the method of 
experimental natural philosophy to other disciplines. In doing this, they relied not only 
on real-world experiments, but also on observations and introspection. Introspection 
was particularly important for the natural histories of the understanding49 and for the 
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authors who sought ‘to account for Moral, as the great Newton has taught us to explain 
Natural appearances’.50 Their experimental philosophy could be called an experiential 
philosophy, insofar as it relies not only on experiments, but on all varieties of 
experience. As we saw in the introduction, Wolff too claimed that experimentation 
should be extended to every part of philosophy. To this end, he relied on real-world 
experiments as well as observations and introspection. On the whole, Wolff agreed on 
many points with British experimental philosophers, especially those Newtonians who 
aimed to ‘banish all hypotheses’.51 Yet, as we will now see, Wolff’s considered views 
on hypotheses differ from those of the Newtonians. 
 
 
4. Wolff vs the Newtonians on Hypotheses 
 
Like the Newtonians, Wolff praises experiments and criticizes the way many natural 
philosophers employ hypotheses. Yet Wolff does not ‘absolutely reject every use of 
hypotheses’.52 In his view, ‘[p]hilosophy must use hypotheses insofar as they pave the 
way to the discovery of certain truth’.53 
Astronomers provide the model for this use of hypotheses: 
 
From some apparent events, they infer what they have to assume, in order 
for [the events] to follow, and they posit [...] that the hypothesis applies to 
all [similar] events [...] To determine whether they did well to assume the 
hypothesis, they infer what follows from it on the basis of a correct 
reasoning, in order to compare it with the remaining phenomena that they 
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have observed or that can be inferred from observations. [They do this] to 
determine whether what has been observed agrees with the hypothesis. If 
they gather that [observations and hypothesis] are in contrast with one 
another, they improve the hypothesis, and in this way they constantly move 
closer to the truth.54 
 
Natural philosophers should imitate ‘astronomers by deriving hypotheses from common 
observations and by correcting and perfecting them after they have sought [to make 
new] observations and to examine experiments’.55 ‘And so, in the same way of 
astronomers, we come closer and closer to the truth, until [...] we finally reach it’.56 
Observations and experiments, then, are not an alternative to the assumption of 
hypotheses. On the one hand, experiments are necessary ‘as examinations of physical 
hypotheses’.57 They enable us to confirm, refine, or reject them. On the other hand, 
hypotheses and the theories of which they are part can provide a stimulus to carry out 
new observations or experiments. ‘Based on the example of the astronomer’, Wolff 
stresses 
 
how much theory owes to observations and how much, on the other hand, 
observations owe to theory, since observations perfect theory and theory in 
turn continuously perfects observations. He who is ignorant of any theory 
and does not have much ability to use the faculty of knowing will only 
discover obvious and mostly imprecise [truths] on the basis of observations. 
There would not be much progress, unless one could presuppose some 
theory; and the more [a theory] is developed, the more discoveries one will 
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make by means of observation[s].58 
 
Consistent with this emphasis on the interaction of hypotheses and observations, 
Wolff criticizes those who reject every hypothesis within natural philosophy: 
 
If one rejects the use of hypotheses within philosophy, and only wants to 
admit what is already certain and established, he will much obstruct the 
progress of the sciences, which able philosophers should promote as much 
as they can.59 
 
Many Newtonians could fall within the category that Wolff criticizes. According to 
Wolff, those who praise Newton for excluding hypotheses from the domain of natural 
philosophy do not realize that Newton himself 
 
indulges in hypotheses in those very areas in which they think he abstained 
from employing them [...] In fact, what else is universal attraction or 
gravity, [...] if not a hypothesis which is assumed because of certain 
phenomena and then is extended to all matter?60 
 
Wolff’s refrain is that not the use, but the abuse of hypotheses is to be condemned.61 He 
formulates several prescriptions that philosophers should follow to avoid abusing of 
hypotheses. For instance, 
 
• before accepting a hypothesis, one should make sure that it does not entail any 
13 
contradiction;62 
• one must show that the entities whose existence the hypothesis implies exist in 
nature;63 
• if a hypothesis is incompatible with one single observed phenomenon, it must be 
abandoned;64 
• if a hypothesis does not explain all the phenomena that it was designed to 
explain, it is improbable (L §610); 
• since experiments and observations can make hypotheses more probable, but not 
certain, one must never mistake hypotheses for certain propositions, which 
Wolff calls dogmas.65 Also, one should not employ hypotheses as premises in 
the proofs of dogmas, because one cannot establish a certain proposition on the 
basis of uncertain assumptions (DP §128); 
• one must not employ hypotheses as reasons for action where mistakes might 
bring about dangerous consequences, for instance within medicine and moral 
philosophy.66 
 
 
5. Wolff and Refined Experimentalists 
 
Not all experimental philosophers were as radical as Newton in their professed rejection 
of hypotheses. Some granted that hypotheses may have a place within natural 
philosophy, but only in a distant future, after the completion of large natural histories on 
which hypotheses can be based.67 Yet, as a matter of fact, British experimental 
philosophers did not wait until the completion of natural histories to endorse a number 
14 
of hypotheses, such as the corpuscularian hypothesis.68 This suggests that, in their view, 
we are entitled to endorse some hypotheses before the completion of natural histories. 
According to Robert Hooke, this was the position of the Royal Society. Hooke writes 
that the Royal Society rejected not every hypothesis, but ‘any Hypothesis not 
sufficiently grounded and confirm’d by Experiments’.69 Along similar lines, Thomas 
Sydenham proposed that hypotheses based on facts and observations are ‘stable and 
permanent’.70 Wolff would agree. 
The endorsement of some natural philosophical hypotheses led Robert Boyle, like 
Wolff, to formulate a list of the requirements that a hypothesis should satisfy to be 
‘good’ or even ‘excellent’.71 Despite their proclamations against theorizing and 
speculating, Boyle and Hooke admitted that knowing some hypotheses and theories 
helps researchers in their observations and experiments: 
 
For by this Means the Mind will be somewhat more ready at guessing at the 
Solution of many Phenomena almost at first Sight, and thereby be much 
more prompt at making Queries, and at tracing the Subtilty of Nature, and in 
discovering and searching into the true Reason of things.72 
 
In turn, experiments and observations test hypotheses,73 giving rise to a virtuous circle 
of experiment and theory. Thus, Boyle detailed the mutual benefits of experimental and 
speculative philosophy, including those ‘flowing from speculative philosophy to 
experiments’.74 Boyle’s and Hooke’s views are in line with Wolff’s comments on ‘how 
much theory owes to observations and how much, on the other hand, observations owe 
to theory’, quoted in Section 4.75 
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In view of these similarities between the views of Boyle, Hooke, and Wolff, it is 
tempting to class them all as refined experimentalists. While emphasizing the reliance 
of natural philosophy on experience, refined experimentalists acknowledge the 
usefulness of hypotheses and the reciprocal relation of experiment and theory. However, 
there are two significant differences between Wolff on the one hand, Boyle and Hooke 
on the other. 
First, Boyle highlights the reciprocal relation of experiment and theory while 
explaining how to construct natural histories.76 This is the first stage of natural 
philosophical inquiries. Its aim is not to refine theories or hypotheses, but to collect data 
in view of the future elaboration of natural philosophical systems. Although Hooke 
acknowledges the reciprocal relation of hypotheses and experiments, he also states that, 
until a ‘Philosophical History’ is ‘pretty well stored with choice and sound Materials, 
the Work of raising new Axiomes or Theories is not to be attempted’.77 It is not obvious 
how Boyle’s and Hooke’s statements on the reciprocal relation of experiment and 
theory can be reconciled with their two-stage model of natural philosophical inquiry. 
This problem does not arise for Wolff because the two-stage model is foreign to his 
outlook. For Wolff, data collection and theory building are largely simultaneous and 
interdependent. 
Second, experimental philosophers like Boyle and Hooke hold that our entire 
natural philosophical knowledge must be acquired a posteriori from the ‘materials’ of 
observations and experiments.78 Boyle and Hooke would reject any non-empirical 
proposition as an unwarranted speculation. By contrast, Wolff holds that a priori 
propositions are an essential part of natural philosophy.79 According to Wolff, 
experiments are useful to confirm ‘what has been proven a priori’.80 For instance, 
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the rules of motion, which have been discovered by the new 
mathematicians, are indeed proven in [mixed] mathematics; however, this 
does not prevent one from explaining them by means of experiments as 
well. When Galileo discovered the rules according to which heavy bodies 
move when they go upward, they fall or they are thrown, he did not stop at 
mathematical demonstrations, but he also confirmed them with experiments. 
Also, the great mathematicians Huygens and Wren proceeded in the same 
way [...] They had good reason [to do so]. In fact, experiments are proofs 
that one sets up in order to get further reassurance that one has not been 
unlucky in one’s reflection.81 
 
These statements make clear that, for Wolff, natural philosophical knowledge does not 
derive entirely a posteriori from experiments and observations. Some natural 
philosophical claims can only be established a posteriori, but others can be established a 
priori and then confirmed a posteriori. 
This integration of a priori and a posteriori knowledge is reflected in Wolff’s 
statements on the relations between the sciences. In his view, experimental physics is 
not the whole of physics. It is only the first part of physics, designed to provide 
experiments and observations on which dogmatic physics will build (DP §109). The 
latter is based on experiments, but also on demonstrative arguments. Moreover, physics 
borrows some principles from general cosmology (DP §94). This is the part of 
metaphysics that establishes the features of any possible world (DP §78) by means of 
demonstrative arguments from ontological principles (CG §2). Within cosmology as 
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‘within the whole of philosophy’, experience makes it possible to ‘confirm a posteriori 
dogmas established a priori’ (CG §4 n.) Thus, for instance, empirical psychology 
precedes rational psychology and provides some principles for it (PE §4). However, 
rational psychology is not based solely on experience. It also establishes some claims a 
priori.82 Some of them lead to conclusions that empirical psychology can prove a 
posteriori (PE §5), confirming the conclusions of rational psychology.83 
Wolff’s statements on the relations between the sciences make clear that, although 
he follows experimental philosophers in praising observations and experiments, he does 
not follow them in rejecting demonstrative reasoning and a priori arguments. Wolff 
often uses the phrase ‘marriage of reason and experience’ [connubium rationis et 
experientiae] to capture the main thrust of his system.84 In the spirit of that phrase, 
Wolff combines experiments with hypotheses. He emphasizes the experiential basis of 
philosophy, while integrating it with a priori arguments. He endeavors to develop 
thoroughly experiential or experimental sub-disciplines, like empirical psychology and 
experimental physics, but he combines each of them with a sub-discipline that relies at 
least in part on a priori arguments, like rational psychology and dogmatic physics. 
Accordingly, rather than being a universal experimental philosophy, Wolff’s system 
may be a combination of experimental or experiential sub-disciplines with sub-
disciplines that employ speculative arguments decried by experimental philosophers. 
To assess whether this suggestion is correct, we must examine Wolff’s notion of 
the a priori. If Wolff has a weak or unconventional notion of the a priori, he may state 
that some claims of dogmatic physics or rational psychology are established a priori 
even if they ultimately rely on experience. 
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6. Wolff’s Weak A Priori 
 
As it turns out, Wolff’s notion of the a priori is so weak that early modern experimental 
philosophers could have easily admitted the existence of a priori truths in Wolff’s sense. 
Wolff does not adopt the old notion of a priori proof as a proof of statements about 
effects from statements on their causes, nor does he adopt the later notion a priori truth 
as a truth that is independent from experience.85 Wolff calls a truth a priori if it has been 
established by means of an inference: 
 
Indeed, either we make use of our own capacities to establish [truths] only 
by means of our sense[s], or else we derive yet unknown [truths] by inferring 
them from other cognitions. In the former case we are said to discover a 
truth a posteriori, whereas in the latter case [we are said to discover a truth] 
a priori.86 
 
For Wolff, all inferences can be formulated as syllogisms.87 We discover truths a priori 
when we establish them by means of syllogisms (PE §460), regardless of whether their 
premises have been established empirically or independently of experience. 
When all the premises that we rely on have been established by means of 
inferences, we are employing what Wolff calls pure reason. When some of the premises 
that we rely on have been established non-inferentially on the basis of experience, we 
are employing impure reason (PE §495). Wolff calls the cognitions that we acquire by 
means of impure reason mixed cognitions: 
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A mixed cognition is a cognition that is acquired partially a posteriori and 
partially a priori. 
For instance, from experience, i.e. by paying attention to what we see, 
we learn that the Sun emits light. Hence, we know that the Sun emits light a 
posteriori. From the definition of a triangle and by means of an inference, 
we discover the reason why its three angles are equal to two right angles; 
hence, we cognize it a priori. From the effects of the Sun, that we know a 
posteriori, we discover by means of the notion of fire that the Sun is [made 
of] fire: hence, our cognition that the Sun is [made of] fire is mixed. (PE 
§434) 
 
We rely on pure reason only ‘in arithmetic, geometry and algebra. [...] Reason in 
physics is the least pure, because everywhere within physics we accept truths known a 
posteriori about [material] things, as is common in astronomy as well’.88 Indeed, 
 
even in abstract disciplines, like first philosophy, fundamental notions must 
be derived from experience, which provides the foundation of factual 
cognition [cognitionem historicam] [...] moral and civil philosophy derive 
principles from experience too. Indeed, even mathematics presupposes some 
factual information [historicam quandam notitiam] from which it derives 
the notion of its object and some axioms. I am referring to pure 
mathematics, as this is [even] more apparent with regard to mixed 
mathematics.89 
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Wolff’s ‘marriage of reason and experience’ is nothing more than the ‘co-
operation of reason’ (that is, inferential knowledge) ‘and experience’ (PE §497) that 
takes place ‘when reason is not pure’ (PE §496). It need not be a combination of 
empirical knowledge with cognitions that, being acquired or justified wholly 
independently of experience, are a priori in a strong sense of the term. The marriage of 
reason and experience takes place, for instance, when experiments confirm conclusions 
previously arrived at by means of inferences. This is what Wolff has in mind when he 
mentions experiments that confirm a priori claims. 
Experimental philosophers would agree that there are a priori cognitions in 
Wolff’s sense of the term. However, they would stress that none of those cognitions is 
also a priori in the stronger sense of having an entirely non-empirical justification (for 
instance, being proven on the basis of premises all of which are established 
independently from experience). To determine whether Wolff would agree with this 
claim, we must examine the structure and foundations of his demonstrative system. 
 
 
7. A Priori Cognitions and Philosophy as a Demonstrative System 
 
As is well known, Wolff’s two series of philosophical treatises (written respectively in 
German and in Latin) adopt a mathematical demonstrative method. Each treatise covers 
one discipline or sub-discipline. Basic disciplines establish claims on which the 
remaining disciplines rely. For instance, physics employs claims established within 
cosmology (DP §94), which borrows some propositions from ontology (CG §9). In each 
treatise, a series of numbered propositions are demonstrated by means of syllogistic 
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arguments from propositions established either earlier on in the treatise, or in treatises 
devoted to more basic disciplines. 
The format of Wolff’s works resembles Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy and 
Spinoza’s Ethics. Descartes’ Principles were a favorite polemical target of experimental 
philosophers from the 1670s onward. Spinoza’s Ethics, with its reliance on many 
propositions that were posited without explicit reference to experience, hardly 
conformed to the methodological precepts of experimental philosophers. Instead, the 
structure of Descartes’ Principles, Spinoza’s Ethics, and Wolff’s works recalls Hobbes’ 
account of the demonstrative method in the passage quoted in Section 2. Hobbes was a 
critic of Boyle’s experimental philosophy and a source of inspiration for Margaret 
Cavendish’s attack on experimental philosophy.90 On the whole, Wolff’s adoption of a 
mathematical demonstrative method associates him with authors who were either 
against or outside of the experimental philosophy movement. This might suggest that 
Wolff’s method is incompatible with a thoroughly experimental philosophy. 
Introducing definitions and axioms and deducing any other propositions from them may 
seem appropriate for a priori inquiries, but not for disciplines that are built on the basis 
of experience. 
In this regard, it should be borne in mind that Wolff distinguishes methods of 
discovery from methods of exposition. Philosophers can use the mathematical method 
as a method of discovery by inferring hitherto unknown truths from known premises 
(PE §403). However, they must also rely on other methods of discovery. These include 
the construction of geometrical figures to discover geometrical theorems (PE §470) and 
recourse to experiments and observations to discover truths about the natural world (PE 
§457). Thus, Wolff’s requirement that we follow the mathematical method of exposition 
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does not preclude one from relying on experience. It is compatible with the view that 
our knowledge has an entirely empirical origin and justification, with the exception at 
most of analytic statements. Seen in these terms, Wolff’s mathematical ideal could be 
an instance of what Condillac called l’esprit systématique, that is, the tendency to 
systematize the cognitions that experience affords us. It need not be an instance of the 
l’esprit de système that experimental philosophers regarded as a hallmark of their 
speculative foes.91 
To understand the significance of Wolff’s mathematical method, we must 
establish whether the premises that provide the foundations of his system are 
established empirically or independently from experience. In particular, we should focus 
on the premises that make – in Kantian terms – synthetic claims about the world, rather 
than those that make analytic claims on linguistic meanings, relations between concepts, 
or how things would be if they existed at all. Assuming that there is a genuine 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, experimental philosophers can 
rely on analytic truths, in addition to synthetic truths that are based on experience. 
Of course, Wolff never literally claimed that we can know analytic or synthetic 
truths a priori. The first explicit statements of the analytic/synthetic distinction were 
made by Immanuel Kant long after Wolff’s death in 1754.92 However, Wolff explains at 
the beginning of his Latin system that we know what is and what happens by means of 
the senses, hence a posteriori (L §§30-1). Wolff claims that we can prove God’s 
existence by employing the ontological argument as formulated by Leibniz.93 Some 
scholars hold that Wolff’s version of this argument turns it into an a posteriori 
argument, but this is controversial.94 If Wolff’s version of Leibniz’s argument is an a 
priori argument, it will be the sole exception to his claim that we can establish 
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existential statements only a posteriori.95 
Setting aside the issue of God’s existence, one could imagine two arguments on 
behalf of the thesis that Wolff’s views, unlike those of experimental philosophers, entail 
the existence of synthetic a priori truths. The first argument concerns our knowledge of 
the laws of nature. The argument relies on three assumptions: 
 
1. Laws of nature are expressed by synthetic statements. 
2. Laws of nature are necessary. 
3. Wolff agrees with Kant’s view that ‘[e]xperience teaches us, to be sure, that 
something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise […] 
if a proposition is thought along with its necessity, it is an a priori judgment’.96 
 
Hence, Wolff must admit that laws of nature are not only synthetic, but also – in virtue 
of their necessity – warranted a priori. 
This argument fails because, for Wolff, laws of nature are not necessary, but 
‘contingent’ (CG §527). They ‘do not have any unescapable necessity’ (Anmerckungen 
§240) ‘for, indeed, they could well have been different’ from how they are (DM §1008). 
In Wolff’s view, it is precisely because the the laws of nature are contingent that they 
‘must be derived from experience’ (Anmerckungen §240). They are expressed by what 
Kant would call synthetic a posteriori statements, not by synthetic a priori statements. 
The second argument concerns our knowledge of essences. Wolff regards the 
essence of a being as the set of its most basic properties. The ascription of those 
properties to a being is the necessary condition for the ascription of any other properties 
to it.97 According to the second argument, Wolff holds the following: 
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1. The knowledge that a feature is an essential property of a being is an instance of 
synthetic knowledge. 
2. Since ‘[t]he essences of things are necessary’,98 to know that a feature is an 
essential property of a being is to know that it necessarily belongs to it. 
3. Necessity requires apriority. The knowledge that a property necessarily belongs 
to a being can only be warranted a priori. 
 
Hence, Wolff must hold that our knowledge of essences is an instance of synthetic a 
priori knowledge. 
Wolff adopts different argumentative strategies to establish what the essence of 
different kinds of being is. In what follows, I will assess the argument with regard to the 
essence of simple beings, which lack parts (DM §75), and to the essences of bodies, 
which have parts and occupy space (DM §§51, 606). The essences of simple beings 
consist of their most basic properties, from which other properties can be derived. The 
most basic properties of simple beings as such are lack of parts, figure, size, or 
movement, and the property of not occuping space (DM §§71, 81). According to Wolff, 
a proper understanding of the notion of a simple being is sufficient to ascribe those 
properties to simple beings (assuming that they exist).99 Hence, knowledge of the 
essence of simple beings is not an instance of synthetic knowledge. It is an instance of 
analytic knowledge. 
‘The essence of a composite being is the way in which’ its ‘parts are combined 
with one another’ (Ontologia §533). Accordingly, to know the essence of a composite 
being is to know what its parts are ‘and how those parts are joined, so that the 
composite may derive from them’ (Ontologia §534). If this were knowledge of 
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necessities, it would have to be warranted by a priori arguments because necessity 
requires apriority. However, Wolff denies that this is knowledge of necessities because 
he holds that any combination of material items is contingent. When Wolff discusses 
the essence of composite beings, he backtracks from his earlier claim that essences are 
necessary and claims instead that the ‘[t]he essence of a composite being consists of 
nothing else than mere accidents’.100 Accordingly, when a composite being splits into 
multiple parts, its essence ‘is removed’ and ‘nothing but mere accidents perishes’ 
(Ontologia §789). 
Since the essences of composite beings are accidental, we can know them on the 
basis of experience. For instance, we know the essence of a clock when, having 
examined it, we understand what its parts are and how they are combined, so as to move 
the clock’s hands.101 We will know the essence of the blood if we identify the types of 
particles that compose it, how and in what ratio they should be mixed to form the 
blood.102 We will know the essence of the human body if we know ‘the shape of its 
individual parts, their qualities, and the way in which they are joined, which are taught 
by anatomy’ on the basis of experience.103 Knowledge of the essence of composite 
beings is not synthetic a priori, but synthetic a posteriori, because those essences are 
contingent. Wolff’s considered view is that the only necessary essences are those of the 
simple beings which, for him, are the basic constituents of reality.104 
One might claim that Wolff’s views differ from those of experimental 
philosophers in yet another way: not because he admitted synthetic a priori truths, but 
because he did not admit any a posteriori truths at all. Two claims that can be found in 
the literature might support the ascription of this view to Wolff. Some scholars have 
claimed that Wolff attempted to derive the whole of human knowledge entirely a 
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priori.105 Others claim that, for Wolff, all knowledge is analytic. The former claim is 
hardly compatible with Wolff’s emphasis on experience as a source of knowledge. As 
for the latter claim, whether Wolff followed Leibniz in holding that all truths are 
ultimately analytic is a complex question that will not be pursued here.106 While some 
interpreters have endorsed this view, others have argued that there are significant 
differences between Wolff’s and Leibniz’s theories of judgment.107 At any rate, even 
assuming that Wolff took all truths to be analytic, the passages quoted above on the 
importance of experience for knowing nature show that Wolff, like Leibniz, thought it 
to be at least practically impossible to know matters of fact by way of analysis.108 They 
can only be established on the basis of experience. Hence, Wolff admitted a posteriori 
truths. 
In fact, Wolff relies on experience in order to establish a large number of 
propositions. These are of two kinds: 
 
• axioms, that is, self-evident propositions that are typically introduced at the 
beginning of Wolff’s treatises. Wolff holds that, although we can accept axioms 
as true simply because they are self-evident, we can also establish their truth by 
means of arguments.109 Several of them are clearly based on experience (e.g. 
Ontologia §27). 
• propositions that are introduced later on in the treatises and, unlike axioms, are 
not self-evident. Of these, some are introduced on the basis of empirical remarks 
(e.g. PE §501). Others are introduced on the basis of a combination of empirical 
remarks and previously proven propositions (e.g. L §5). 
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Propositions that are based, at least in part, on experience can be found in every 
area of Wolff’s system. They include, among others, natural philosophical claims on the 
existence of corpuscles (CG §228), psychological claims on our consciousness of the 
external world (PE §11), and ontological principles like the law of non-contradiction.110 
They are established on the basis of very diverse kinds of experience: 
 
• experience of facts concerning a vast number of items; for instance, that objects 
retain their essential properties, but not their nonessential properties through 
time (L §68); 
• experience of specific occurrences, like the case of a person who grew up in the 
wild among bears;111 
• experience afforded by specific disciplines like astronomy (CG §§51, 52) and 
biology (CG §§53, 54); 
• experience obtained by means of scientific instruments like microscopes (CG 
§§228, 231); 
• linguistic experience, understood as the source of knowledge of facts about the 
correct use of language (L §210); 
• our awareness that we are conscious of ourselves and external objects (PE §11) 
and that our senses give us access to their properties (L §30); 
• awareness of what we can or cannot think; for instance, the impossibility of 
thinking contradictory states of affairs (Ontologia §27). 
 
Wolff relies on experience in the most basic and abstract discipline, ontology, and even 
in a discipline like cosmology (CG §§51, 52, 53, 54, 228, 231) which, he claims, 
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derives entirely from ontological principles (CG §2). Acknowledging this is important 
for realizing that the whole of Wolff’s philosophy can be aptly characterized as a 
philosophia experimentalis universalis, a philosophy that relies on experience at every 
level.112 
However, appeal to experience is not the only way, besides inference, in which 
Wolff introduces new propositions. A striking feature of Wolff’s system is the great 
number of definitions. Wolff has a theory that specifies which definitions are 
acceptable.113 In many cases, however, he does not explain why we should accept 
specific definitions. This contributed to creating the image of Wolff’s system as a 
speculative castle in the air, based on arbitrary stipulations rather than observations and 
experiments.114 Yet, while some Wolff’s definitions appear be stipulative, others appear 
to express or regiment current linguistic usage or to be based on experience. At any rate, 
Wolff does not usually attempt to vindicate his definitions by showing that they are 
based either on experience or on conceptual analysis. All that Wolff expects from his 
readers is to accept that his definitions are true, so that he can use them as the basis for 
subsequent arguments. 
The same applies to many of the propositions for which Wolff provides empirical 
justification, in addition to a priori arguments. For instance, Wolff argues that we can 
know that we are conscious of ourselves and other things by paying ‘attention to our 
perceptions’ (PE §11). He then refutes a hypothetical opponent. The refutation relies on 
the assumption that one can only doubt something if one is conscious (PE §12). It 
would be natural to regard this as an analytic, non-empirical statement based on the 
meaning of ‘to doubt’. However, Wolff is not concerned to specify whether that 
statement, or his argument as a whole, are empirical or non-empirical. He is only 
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interested to establish his claim regarding consciousness, so that he can use it as a 
premise for subsequent demonstrations. 
In order to establish his claims, Wolff does not hesitate to combine various forms 
of justification. This is evident in his defense of the law of sufficient reason in the 
Ontologia. After its first appearance in the Deutsche Metaphysik (§30), Wolff’s law of 
sufficient reason had been subjected to vehement attacks. In response, Wolff’s 
Ontologia adduces many reasons for endorsing it: 
 
• a proof based on earlier propositions (§70); 
• remarks intended to show that the law of sufficient reason is consistent with our 
experience (§72); 
• an argument for the claim that we can regard the law of sufficient reason as an 
empirical generalization (§73); 
• the claim that, psychologically, we would find it difficult to believe that 
something is the case even if there is no reason for it to be the case (§74); 
• the claim that the law of sufficient reason is an axiom, hence it is self-evident 
(§75). 
 
Several of these remarks, including the proof in §70, are based at least in part on 
experience.115 However, Wolff does not stress this. He is not concerned to persuade his 
readers that the law of sufficient reason is true because it has an empirical foundation. 
He is only concerned to persuade his readers that the law of sufficient reason is true. He 
musters every consideration, empirical or otherwise, that he thinks will help him 
achieve that aim. 
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This indicates that quite often, Wolff does not focus on building a system on 
empirical foundations, but on building a system on foundations that his readers will 
accept as solid. Hence, when Wolff takes a definition or proposition to be sufficiently 
uncontroversial, he may introduce it without further justification (e.g. L §219). He may 
claim rhetorically that no one would question it (L §30) or he may state that its truth can 
be seen from examples (L §109). When Wolff argues for a proposition whose empirical 
foundation he finds apparent, his reference to experience may be sketchy, especially if 
compared with the extensive empirical evidence often adduced by Boyle or Newton in 
support of their claims. Often, when a proposition is not an axiom, Wolff only shows 
that it is a priori in the etymological sense of being derived from prior propositions. He 
does not point out whether those propositions include empirical premises, although this 
is typically the case. 
Wolff’s mathematical method is compatible with the development of a system 
entirely based on experience. The method allows indiscriminately for ‘definitions, 
undoubted experiences, and axioms’ (L §498) as premises for demonstrations. 
Definitions and axioms can be based on experience, although Wolff’s mathematical 
method does not require this. It only requires that the system has ‘certain and unmoved 
principles’.116 Empirical statements can fulfill this requirement. When they do, Wolff 
calls them undoubted experiences. Those experiences have withstood rational and 
empirical scrutiny, yet they are by no means indubitable.117 Wolff’s pragmatic stance118 
does not require him to achieve absolute certainty or to chase away Cartesian demons 
before establishing the foundations of his system.119 
As Wolff does not aspire to make the premises of his system demon-proof, so he 
does not endeavor to show that all of those premises are based on experience. While he 
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is keen to show the empirical basis of many claims, he introduces others without 
referring to experience. When he takes their truth to be potentially controversial to his 
(pragmatically minded) readers, he does not hesitate to adduce a host of different 
reasons for accepting those claims. These reasons typically include empirical 
arguments. However, exhibiting the empirical foundation of Wolff’s premises is less 
important in his eyes than dispelling any reason for his readers to doubt them. 
 
 
8. Conclusion: Experimental Philosophy and the Mathematical Method 
 
In conclusion, Wolff shares many commitments with experimental philosophers. He 
emphasizes that every part of philosophy must rely on experiments and observations. 
He allows the use of hypotheses in a way that is consistent with the views of refined 
experimentalists. He takes some claims to be established a priori, but his notion of a 
priori is so weak that experimental philosophers would find this unproblematic. 
Nevertheless, Wolff’s commitment to experimental philosophy does not account for the 
overall structure and certain features of Wolff’s system, such as the many definitions 
whose empirical or non-empirical basis is simply not stated. These features of Wolff’s 
system are to be explained in the light of a second basic commitment. This is the 
commitment to develop his philosophy as a deductive system based on foundations that 
his readers would find uncontroversial. Wolff’s concern to ensure the acceptance of 
those foundations, as required by his mathematical method, sometimes pushes his 
concern to ground philosophy on experience to the background. In the light of this fact, 
an important dimension of Wolff’s connubium rationis et experientiae is his 
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combination of two distinct, albeit compatible, methodological commitments. They are 
his commitment to build a philosophia experimentalis universalis, a universal 
experimental philosophy, and his commitment to develop philosophy as a deductive 
system based on solid foundations. 
Examining Wolff’s system in the light of the tenets of early modern experimental 
philosophers has led to three results. First, Wolff’s system relies on experience to a 
great extent, much more than commentators have generally acknowledged. Second, the 
examination of Wolff’s system shows that early modern experimental philosophy had a 
significant influence in early eighteenth-century Germany, well before Kant’s 
contemporaries like Tetens and Feder endorsed the experimental method in the last 
three decades of the century. Third, Wolff’s alleged empiricism and rationalism can be 
identified or – perhaps more usefully, given the wealth of differing meanings in which 
‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’ are used – replaced with references to two distinct 
methodological commitments. They are Wolff’s commitments to develop a thorough-
going experimental philosophy and to build a mathematically demonstrative system. 
These concurrent methodological commitments are two driving forces at the basis of his 
thought.120 
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